Military Movements and Supply Lines as Comparative Interdiction Targets
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Report Number: RM-6308-PR
Author(s): Higgins, J. W.
Corporate Author(s): The Rand Corporation
Date of Publication: 1970-07
Contract: F44620-67-C-0045
DoD Task:
Identifier: AD0711639
Abstract:
In many tactical situations, the movements of military units appear to be more lucrative targets for interdiction than are their supply lines. Significantly more road or railway capacity is needed for a unit move than for its daily resupply requirement; the unit may not accomplish its mission if it is delayed in reaching its planned battlefield location. Furthermore, supplies can be stockpiled over time whereas unit mobility cannot.A "redeployment/resupply ratio" has been used to make simple quantitative comparisons of the movement of a division's equipment as contrasted with the transportation of supplies for a day's consumption, taking into account the temporary surge increase in road capacity that can be absorbed for a short-duration redeployment but that cannot be sustained over a long period of resupply movements. The assumptions used are biased somewhat toward minimizing the ratio.Road movement yields a unit redeployment/resupply ratio of about 6:1 on a gravel road and almost 8:1 on a paved road. This ration was developed using a U.S. infantry division as a base. Road movement of a military unit should consume six to eight times as much of a road's surge capacity as that unit's daily resupply consumes of the road's average steady-state capacity. A much larger redeployment/resupply ratio, between 127:1 and 145:1, was derived for movements by rail.When such ratios are considered in relation to thee time urgency often associated with the movement of combat forces, countermobility interdiction should be given careful attention in conflicts involving large units of regular military forces; the value of air interdiction should not be assessed on the results of supply line harassment alone.
Author(s): Higgins, J. W.
Corporate Author(s): The Rand Corporation
Date of Publication: 1970-07
Contract: F44620-67-C-0045
DoD Task:
Identifier: AD0711639
Abstract:
In many tactical situations, the movements of military units appear to be more lucrative targets for interdiction than are their supply lines. Significantly more road or railway capacity is needed for a unit move than for its daily resupply requirement; the unit may not accomplish its mission if it is delayed in reaching its planned battlefield location. Furthermore, supplies can be stockpiled over time whereas unit mobility cannot.A "redeployment/resupply ratio" has been used to make simple quantitative comparisons of the movement of a division's equipment as contrasted with the transportation of supplies for a day's consumption, taking into account the temporary surge increase in road capacity that can be absorbed for a short-duration redeployment but that cannot be sustained over a long period of resupply movements. The assumptions used are biased somewhat toward minimizing the ratio.Road movement yields a unit redeployment/resupply ratio of about 6:1 on a gravel road and almost 8:1 on a paved road. This ration was developed using a U.S. infantry division as a base. Road movement of a military unit should consume six to eight times as much of a road's surge capacity as that unit's daily resupply consumes of the road's average steady-state capacity. A much larger redeployment/resupply ratio, between 127:1 and 145:1, was derived for movements by rail.When such ratios are considered in relation to thee time urgency often associated with the movement of combat forces, countermobility interdiction should be given careful attention in conflicts involving large units of regular military forces; the value of air interdiction should not be assessed on the results of supply line harassment alone.